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bservers of workplaces have long noted 
that workers’ attitudes and in particular 
their perception of the fairness of their wage 
can have important effects on economic 
outcomes.  As far back as 1911, John R. Com-
mons wrote,
Each individual differs from others … in the 
psychological motives that induce attention, 
continuity, watchfulness.  Compensation is the 
inducement that evokes these motives, and com-
pensation should be as nicely adjusted to each 
detail of psychology and effort as is the adjustment 
of an electric current to the machine it is fed into. 
The blacksmith’s bonus should be greater than 
the machinist’s, because the blacksmith has to 
be induced to carry a greater load.  (Commons 
1911:468) 
In psychology, Commons’s observation is 
embodied in the “equity theory” of Adams 
478 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
(1963), which argues that workers will adjust 
their performance according to whether they 
feel they are being fairly or unfairly paid 
relative to the amount of effort they expend 
on the job.  This idea is the basis of the 
gift-exchange theory of Akerlof (1982) and 
Akerlof and Yellen (1990), which formalizes 
the hypothesis that workers will reciprocate 
high relative wages with high effort.  This 
theory has gained increasing attention from 
economists in recent years, in part because 
it is consistent with evidence from surveys 
of managers, who typically report that they 
believe employee behavior is influenced by 
fairness perceptions and that they take those 
perceptions into account in their wage and 
employment decisions,1 and in part because 
laboratory experiments have shown that sub-
jects consistently reward behavior perceived 
as fair and punish behavior perceived as un-
fair, even at a cost to themselves in one-shot 
interactions.2
In order to give gift-exchange theory em-
pirical content, one must take a stand on the 
determinants of fairness perceptions—on 
what makes a wage fair.  But despite the in-
creasing attention to the role of fairness, we 
can still say little with confidence about the 
determinants of employees’ wage-fairness 
perceptions in real workplaces.  One conclu-
sion that emerges from the experimental 
literature in psychology and sociology is that 
people tend to form fairness judgments in 
reference to an alternative transaction or 
aspect of behavior that has come to be seen 
as fair, often referred to as a reference point.3  A 
second conclusion is that the process by which 
an alternative transaction comes to be seen as 
fair can be sensitive to apparently incidental 
details of the framing of an experiment or 
hypothetical situation (Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler 1986).  As a consequence, the 
experimental results are not robust indica-
tors of which reference points—the salaries 
of other employees in the same workplace, 
the profits of the firm, conditions in the 
outside labor market, or some other point 
of comparison—are salient for employees in 
real workplaces.
A large number of non-experimental stud-
ies have documented correlations between 
employee attitudes and wages relative to 
various reference points (Akerlof, Rose, 
and Yellen 1988; Cappelli and Sherer 1988, 
1990; Levine 1993b; Lincoln and Kalleberg 
1990).4  But such correlations are consistent 
with a number of causal mechanisms:  an ef-
fect of relative wages on employees’ fairness 
perceptions; an effect of selection of workers 
with management-friendly attitudes into jobs 
with high relative wages; or an effect of unob-
served heterogeneity across workplaces—for 
instance, in the abilities of managers—on 
both wages and attitudes.  Existing studies 
using observations from real workplaces have 
had difficulty distinguishing among these 
different effects.
In this paper, we examine the relationship 
between local labor market conditions and 
employees’ perceptions of the fairness of their 
wage.5  We draw on an internal attitude survey 
in the freight-handling terminals of a large 
unionized U.S. trucking firm, conducted year-
ly over the period 1996–2000.  The key to our 
identification strategy is the fact that wages 
in each terminal are determined in collective 
bargaining at a national and regional level, 
with local managers having no discretion to 
vary wage rates in response to local labor 
market conditions.6  As a result of this pattern 
1See Agell and Lundborg (1995), Bewley (1999), 
Blinder and Choi (1990), Campbell and Kamlani (1997), 
Levine (1993a), and Bewley (1999).  Bewley (2002) 
provides useful surveys.
2See Fehr and Gachter (2000) and Rabin (1998) 
for surveys.
3See Martin (1981) and Dornstein (1991) for sur-
veys.
4See also the reviews in Martin (1981) and Dornstein 
(1991).
5The institutional characteristics of the firm we study, 
discussed in more detail below, limit variation in internal 
wage structure and prevent us from evaluating the role 
of internal reference points.
6Because terminal managers have no discretion, 
we are not able to examine the role of intentions in 
the formation of fairness judgments, as emphasized by 
Rabin (1993).  We test instead the original formulation 
of Akerlof (1982), in which the effect of relative wage 
premia on fairness perceptions does not depend on 
how the premia are brought about.  The fact that wage 
premia in the firm we study are not a consequence of 
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of wage determination, economic shocks in 
the local area surrounding each terminal 
over the study period generated exogenous 
variation in the attractiveness of the wage paid 
by the firm relative to employees’ options 
in the outside labor market.  We relate this 
variation to variation in fairness attitudes, and 
argue that our estimates measure the causal 
effect of local labor market conditions on 
employee wage-fairness perceptions separate 
from the confounding effects of selection 
and unobserved heterogeneity.
Recent surveys of managers have found 
that managers do not believe outside labor 
market conditions have an important ef-
fect on employee morale.7  As we will see 
below, our results using direct responses of 
employees differ sharply from those of the 
manager surveys, suggesting that the opinion 
of managers may sometimes be a poor guide 
to the process by which employees form fair-
ness judgments.
In addition to the work cited above, our 
study is related to an extensive literature in 
industrial relations on the role of wage com-
parisons in wage-setting.  In an important 
early contribution, Ross (1948) observed that 
workers’ fairness perceptions often depend 
on external comparisons and, in turn, drive 
the bargaining behavior of union leaders. 
Ross tended to downplay the role of local 
labor market conditions, and instead stressed 
the role of product markets, common owner-
ship of establishments, centralized bargain-
ing, and government involvement.8  In an-
other important early contribution, Dunlop 
(1957) attributed a central role to “key rates,” 
which we can interpret as reference points in 
our terminology, against which wage-fairness 
is evaluated.  Dunlop argued that the set of 
outside wages that are relevant for external 
comparisons—the “wage contour”—are those 
in firms with product market characteristics, 
geographic location, and occupational mix 
similar to those of the firm in question.  We 
view our work as complementary to this 
institutionalist literature, which has often 
relied heavily on case-study evidence.  The 
advantage of our research design is that we 
are able to control for a wide variety of pos-
sible confounding factors and isolate the 
causal effect of local conditions on worker 
wage-fairness perceptions.  Our work is also 
related to Cappelli and Chauvin (1991), 
who related local labor market conditions 
to employee dismissal rates across plants of a 
single large firm, but who possessed neither 
data on employee attitudes nor time-series 
information on particular plants.
1. The Firm and the Data
The firm we study is a large, national carrier 
in the less-than-truckload segment of the U.S. 
for-hire freight-hauling industry.  The term 
less-than-truckload, as opposed to truckload, 
refers to companies that mainly move freight 
smaller than the capacity of a standard tractor-
trailer.9  Unlike truckload companies, which 
require no special coordinating mechanism 
to ship freight between two points, virtually 
all successful less-than-truckload companies 
maintain a network of distribution terminals 
to collect freight from surrounding catch-
ment areas and consolidate it into trac-
tor-trailer-size loads for shipment to other 
the intentional behavior of local managers should make 
it more difficult for us to find effects of local conditions 
on fairness perceptions.  Also, we observe attitudes for a 
relatively small number of years and cannot investigate 
how or why fairness norms arise, the subject of Axelrod 
(1986), Carmichael and MacLeod (2003), and many 
other papers.
7Summarizing his findings from conversations with 
managers, Bewley (2002) wrote, “Employees usually have 
little notion of a fair or market value for their services 
and quickly come to believe they are entitled to their 
existing pay, no matter how high it may be.  Workers do 
not use pay rates at other firms as reference wages, for 
they know too little about them” (Bewley 2002:9).  He 
acknowledged that unionized workers may be an excep-
tion to this rule.  Levine (1993a), summarizing manag-
ers’ responses to a series of hypothetical wage-setting 
scenarios, wrote, “The interviews strongly supported the 
hypothesis that unemployment rates are not important 
determinants of pay changes in large organizations, 
since the respondents neither formally nor informally 
considered unemployment rates when determining pay 
adjustments” (Levine 1993a:1249).
8Ross wrote, “Locality, an essential characteristic 
of the labor market so far as supply and demand are 
concerned, is of limited relevance for wage determina-
tion.”  (Ross 1948:62.)
9The capacity of an entire tractor-trailer is about 
45,000–50,000 lbs.  A typical shipment in the less-than-
truckload segment is 1,000 lbs.
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terminals.  Many of the larger firms in the 
industry organize such local terminals into 
hub-and-spoke networks, with a second level 
of consolidation taking place at hubs.  Prior 
to the deregulation of the trucking industry 
in 1980, most firms provided both truckload 
and less-than-truckload services.  Following 
deregulation, the industry divided sharply, 
with most firms specializing in one or the 
other segment (Belzer 1994; Burks, Monaco, 
and Myers-Kuykindall 2004).  The less-than-
truckload segment, with higher barriers to 
entry in the form of costs of establishing 
and maintaining a distribution network, has 
remained more oligopolistic than the truck-
load segment, although industry analysts 
agree that price mark-ups over costs are low 
(Nebesky, McMullen, and Lee 1995), and in 
recent years smaller regional carriers have 
made inroads into the national market.  The 
labor market in the industry has segmented 
in parallel with the product market, with 
wages and union coverage declining sharply 
in the truckload segment, but more slowly 
in the less-than-truckload segment (Belzer 
1995, 2000; Burks 1999).
The hubs in the hub-and-spoke terminal 
networks are referred to in the industry as 
breakbulk terminals.  The breakbulk termi-
nals in the firm we study are evenly dispersed 
across the continental United States.  In June, 
July, or August of each year from 1996 to 2000, 
the firm paid an outside consultant to conduct 
an anonymous attitude survey of its employ-
ees.  We have individual-level responses to the 
survey for 29 breakbulks.10  We focus on the 
attitudes of dockworkers, the employees who 
load and unload freight.  These workers are 
not drivers; they are stationed permanently 
on a loading dock in a particular terminal. 
The work they do is semi-skilled, requiring 
agile use of a forklift and some ingenuity 
to move and stack freight of varying size, 
weight, shape, and fragility compactly and 
with a minimum of damage.  We have data 
only on regular, full-time employees, not on 
contingent (“casual”) employees.
The attitude survey consisted of a series 
of statements—20 in 1996–1998, 40 in 
1999–2000—with which respondents were 
asked to agree or disagree.  The statements 
addressed various aspects of social relations 
within each terminal, including communica-
tion between employees and managers, the 
quality of working conditions, and work rules 
and procedures.  In 1996, 1997, and 1998, 
respondents were also asked to report their 
age, education, race, sex, and tenure in the 
firm.  In 1999 and 2000, partly in response to 
employee complaints, the demographic ques-
tions were dropped, but the tenure question 
remained.  The response rate to the attitude 
survey, which varied little across breakbulks, 
averaged 71.5%.
We focus on the statement regarding wage 
fairness, “I feel I am paid fairly for the kind 
of work I do.”  Respondents filled in a bubble 
for one of three possible responses, “agree” 
“disagree,” or “?”11  Using this question as a 
measure of fairness perceptions may raise a 
number of concerns.  The first is whether 
the measure is consistent in the sense that 
it captures the same underlying attitude 
across different respondents and for a given 
respondent over time.  The attitude survey 
we use was developed by a private consultant, 
and to our knowledge no rigorous studies of 
the consistency of this particular question 
have been carried out.  But the wording of 
the question is nearly identical to the word-
ing of questions from two popular attitude 
surveys.  The Job Satisfaction Survey (JSS) 
asks respondents to rate their agreement 
with the statement “I feel I am being paid a 
fair amount for the work I do” on a 6-point 
scale (disagree very much, disagree moder-
ately, disagree slightly, agree slightly, agree 
moderately, agree very much).  The Min-
nesota Satisfaction Questionnaire (MSQ) 
asks respondents to rate their satisfaction 
with “The amount of pay for the work I do” 
10The firm operates more terminals than we have 
data for.  The exact number of terminals is unreported 
in order to preserve the confidentiality of the firm.
11One unfortunate characteristic of the attitude 
data is that missing values were given the same code 
as “?” responses, and are indistinguishable from those 
responses.  In unreported results, we estimated models 
treating the “?” as missing, as “agree” responses, and as 
“disagree” responses.  The results are similar to those 
reported here.
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on a 5-item scale (very dissatisfied, dissatis-
fied, neutral, satisfied, very satisfied).  The 
JSS has been used in dozens and the MSQ 
in hundreds of studies, and both have been 
validated extensively.12
A second concern is that our attitude 
measure is based on the response to a single 
question, unlike most standard measures 
of pay satisfaction (including those derived 
from the JSS and the MSQ), which combine 
several questions into an index.  It would 
clearly be preferable to have additional re-
sponses related to pay satisfaction.  But in a 
meta-analysis of research in the closely related 
area of job satisfaction, Wanous, Reichers, 
and Hudy (1997) recently showed that single-
item measures tend to have an acceptably 
high correlation (average .63) with multi-
item scale measures.  In addition, greater 
measurement error in the fairness response, 
our main dependent variable, should make 
it more difficult for us to find a statistically 
significant effect of local labor market con-
ditions.13  The fact that we nonetheless find 
statistically significant results suggests that 
our measure is capturing a real attitude.
A third concern is whether the question 
captures the theoretical concept that it is de-
signed to capture—what social psychologists 
call “construct validity.”  The question cor-
responds closely to the notion of fairness in 
“equity theory” (Adams 1963)—on which the 
gift-exchange approach of Akerlof (1982) and 
Akerlof and Yellen (1990) is in part based—in 
that it explicitly asks respondents to account 
for the skill and effort they devote to the job 
(the “inputs” in Adams’s terminology) as well 
as the level of compensation.  The fact that 
the question corresponds so closely to the 
questions in the JSS and MSQ also suggests 
that it captures what social psychologists 
conventionally mean by pay satisfaction.
A fourth concern relates to the way we use 
the question.  Our empirical specification 
will test whether higher wages are positively 
and linearly related to wage-fairness percep-
tions.  We thus assume that respondents 
are not more likely to think of themselves 
as overpaid—and to think of their wage as 
unfair for that reason—as their relative wage 
rises.  Our approach is in the spirit of Akerlof 
(1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990), who 
assumed that workers reduce effort if their 
wage is below a reference “fair” wage, but not 
if the wage is above the fair wage (regardless 
of how far above it is).14  The psychological 
evidence on the effect of overpayment is 
controversial and mixed (see the review in 
Akerlof and Yellen 1990), but a growing body 
of work on “self-serving biases”—the tendency 
for people “to conflate what is fair with what 
benefits oneself” (Babcock and Loewenstein 
1997:110)—in a variety of domains supports 
the view that well-paid employees are likely 
to adjust their perception of the value of 
their contribution to the firm upward rather 
than view their wage as unfair.  Again, if some 
employees did become less likely to view 
their wage as fair as their relative wage rose, 
that would make it harder for us to find the 
results we find.  For the above reasons, we 
have confidence that our measure of fairness 
perceptions, while far from ideal, is accept-
able for our purposes.
The results in this paper are based on two 
different samples:  the “short” sample, which 
includes information on demographics as 
well as tenure and attitudes but only covers the 
years 1996–98; and the “long” sample, which 
includes information on tenure and attitudes 
but not demographics and covers the years 
1996–2000.  Within each sample, observa-
tions with incomplete information have been 
discarded.  Summary statistics for the short 
sample appear in Panel A of Table 1.  The 
dockworkers in the firm were almost entirely 
male and approximately three-quarters white, 
12See Spector (1985, 1997) on the JSS, and Weiss et 
al. (1967) on the MSQ.
13Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) expressed a 
general concern with attitude surveys that measurement 
error in attitudes may be correlated with individual 
characteristics.  But in our case, since we control for 
terminal fixed effects and turnover is low (6% on aver-
age), identification is largely based on changes in fairness 
perceptions by individuals over time.  As long as the 
correlation between individual characteristics and the 
measurement error in attitudes is constant over time, it 
will be largely captured by the terminal effects.
14More specifically, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) assumed 
that workers withdraw effort if their wage is below the 
relevant reference wage, but that effort is unchanged 
if their wage is above the reference wage.
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with a higher-than-proportionate number of 
non-whites concentrated in a few terminals 
in the South.  The modal worker was 31–40 
years of age, with a high school diploma, 
although over 40% were older than 40, and 
over 40% had some college experience or a 
college degree.  Roughly 35% of workers in 
the firm had more than 10 years of tenure, 
and roughly 70% considered themselves to 
be paid fairly.  Summary statistics on tenure 
and fairness responses for the long sample 
appear in Panel B of Table 1 and are similar 
to those for the short sample.
Workers in the firm are unionized and 
represented by the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters.  Two characteristics of 
the collective bargaining process are espe-
cially relevant.  The first is that the patterns 
of changes in wages and working conditions 
are determined at a national and regional 
level by negotiations between the Teamsters 
union and a consortium of national trucking 
firms.  The national negotiations, codified 
in the National Master Freight Agreement, 
set the pattern of wage increases over the 
life of the contract.  Relatively small adjust-
ments can then be made at a regional level 
in supplements to the national agreement, 
again as the result of negotiations between 
the union and the consortium of firms.  The 
second noteworthy characteristic of the col-
lective bargaining process dates from the 
days of James R. Hoffa in the 1960s, when 
the Teamsters union successfully bargained 
for a nationally uniform wage for each cat-
egory of employees, to prevent employers 
from shifting work geographically to reduce 
wages (Levinson 1981).  This wage structure 
persists, and still specifies nearly identical 
wages for workers doing similar jobs across the 
country, despite large variations in regional 
labor market conditions.
As a consequence of this institutional prior-
ity of the union, wages in the firm vary little 
across breakbulk terminals.15  The average 
real base wage over the period was $17.80/
hour in 1996 dollars, and the standard devia-
tion within a given year was never more than 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics, 
Individual-Level Variables.
Response Percentage of Total





































Notes:  N = 9,361 for short sample, 15,657 for long 
sample.  Samples include only observations with com-
plete data (on sex, race, age, schooling, tenure, and 
fairness response for the short sample, and on tenure 
and fairness response for the long sample).  See section 
1 of text and the data appendix for details on sample 
selection.  Fairness response is in reference to statement, 
“I feel I am paid fairly for the kind of work I do.”
15A complete table of base wage rates at each terminal 
in each year is available from the authors.
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$.08 over the 1996–2000 period.  The pattern 
of yearly wage increases is set out in the na-
tional contract, and wage increases each year 
are roughly constant across terminals.  New 
(non-casual) hires receive 75% of the base 
wage initially, 80% after 1 year, 90% after 18 
months, and 100% after 2 years, after which 
they receive the base wage for the remainder 
of their tenure in the firm.  Because newly 
hired workers could expect to rise up the wage 
ladder quickly, we assume that new hires took 
the full base wage to be the relevant wage in 
forming fairness judgments; the results are 
not affected if we assume instead that they 
focused on the actual new-hire wage.  The 
crucial aspect of this wage-setting process 
for our study is that local managers have no 
discretion to adjust wage rates at the terminal 
level.  Variation in local labor market condi-
tions over the study period thus generated 
exogenous variation in the attractiveness of 
the wage paid by the firm relative to employ-
ees’ outside options.
The firm made available the measure it 
uses internally to track the workload in each 
terminal.  The firm’s industrial engineers 
have calculated how long each task involved 
in loading or unloading a truck (for example, 
“push empty cart into trailer,” “carefully 
read freight label,” “walk laden to cart unob-
structed”) should take to complete.  On the 
basis of these measurements, they calculate 
the length of time the bundle of tasks that 
each freight load represents should take to 
complete.  We refer to the predicted time 
required for all freight passing through a 
terminal in a given year as the terminal’s 
“projected work-time.”  Note that the com-
position of freight is determined by factors 
outside of each breakbulk, and can be taken 
to be exogenous to employee attitudes and 
performance within the terminal.
The firm also provided us with data on 
the number of new hires and permanent 
separations in each terminal in each year.  We 
know the type of separation:  dismissal, resig-
nation in lieu of dismissal, quit, retirement, 
or death.16  This measure does not include 
layoffs due to fluctuations in the freight flow 
at each terminal.  Under the union contract, 
permanent (that is, not “casual”) workers who 
are laid off retain the right to be recalled; the 
firm does not count such layoffs as dismissals. 
The dismissal rate is a measure of serious 
Table 2.  Summary Statistics, Terminal-Level Variables 
from Firm and Indicators of Local Labor Market Conditions.
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
A.  Terminal-Level Variables from Firm
Dismissal Rate 144 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.08
Separation Rate 144 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.16
Overtime Share 144 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.11
Log Projected Work-Time 144 0.48 0.52 –0.42 1.82
Base Wage 144 17.80 0.25 16.93 18.31
Log Base Wage 144 2.88 0.01 2.83 2.91
B.  Indicators of Local Labor Market Conditions
Local Unemployment Rate 144 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.08
Weighted-Average Log Outside Wage 144 2.66 0.10 2.38 2.94
Individual-Specific Log Outside Wage 9,163 2.65 0.21 1.80 3.44
Notes:  One terminal does not have attitude data in 1999 and is omitted in that year.  Projected work-time is 
measured in 100,000s of hours.  Dismissal rate is the number of dismissals and resignations in lieu of dismissal in 
the year as a fraction of total employment at the time of the survey.  Separation rate is total separations in the year 
as a fraction of total employment at the time of survey.  Overtime share is yearly overtime hours as a fraction of 
total hours worked.  See section 2 of the text and the data appendix for details on construction of outside wage 
terms.  Wages are in constant 1996 dollars.
16Our measure of separations only includes separa-
tions of workers who were employed on June 30, the 
day for which we have measures of total employment, in 
some year 1996–2000.  Our measure thus misses some 
workers who left shortly after being hired.
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behavioral infractions.17  Summary statistics 
on the terminal-level variables from the firm 
appear in Panel A of Table 2.
Further details on variable definitions are 
in the data appendix.
2. Indicators of Local 
Labor Market Conditions
We focus on two indicators of local labor 
market conditions:  the local unemployment 
rate and the wage received by similar workers 
in the outside labor market.  The definition 
of local labor markets is explained in detail 
in the data appendix; as a general rule, the 
local labor market is the Metropolitan Statis-
tical Area (MSA) in which a given terminal 
is located.  The measure of local unemploy-
ment is the average yearly unemployment 
from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics 
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS).
Our measures of the wages of similar work-
ers in the outside labor market are construct-
ed as follows.  We estimate a wage equation 
on pooled 12-month samples of full-time male 
workers from the merged Outgoing Rotation 
Groups (ORGs) of the Current Population 
Survey (CPS), separately for each local labor 
market in each year.  (Details on selection 
of the sample appear in the data appendix.) 
There are a number of ways that one might 
specify the wage equations.  If we think that 
workers in the firm compared their wage to 
the wage that they themselves would have 
received if they had lost their jobs, then we 
should regress wages only on demographic 
characteristics and perhaps occupation.  If, 
on the other hand, we think that workers 
compared themselves to workers in similar 
jobs in the outside market, then we should 
include an indicator of union status as well. 
The theoretical and experimental literatures 
on fairness do not provide much guidance 
in making this decision.  We prefer the lat-
ter specification, because our sense is that 
workers have better information about the 
wages of workers in similar jobs than about 
the wage they themselves would receive if they 
lost their jobs.  The former specification is 
also plausible, however, and we report results 
using both approaches.
Using our preferred specification, we es-
timate the following equation, separately for 
each local labor market in each year:
(1) wkjt = 0,jt + D '1,kjt 1,jt + D '2,kjt 2,jt + 
D '3,kjt 3,jt + D '4,kjt 4,jt + D '5,kjt 5,jt + kjt,
where k indexes individuals in the CPS; j in-
dexes local labor markets; t indexes years; w
represents the log real hourly wage, deflated 
by a regional price index (see the data ap-
pendix for details); D1, D2, and D3 are vectors 
of dummy variables for age, education, and 
race, defined according to the demographic 
categories in the firm’s attitude survey; D4 is 
a dummy variable indicating blue-collar or 
white-collar occupation; and D5 is a dummy 
variable indicating union status.  Because 
of insufficient numbers of observations for 
each MSA-year in the CPS, it is not possible 
to estimate a more general model with more 
detailed occupation indicators or interactions 
of the demographic indicators.
On the basis of these regressions, we con-
struct two different outside wage measures. 
For the first measure, which we refer to as the 
individual-specific outside wage, each individual 
in the firm is assigned the predicted log real 
wage for a blue-collar, unionized full-time 
male worker with identical age, race, and 
schooling characteristics in the CPS regres-
sion.  This method has the advantage that it 
takes the human capital and other individual 
characteristics of workers into account in 
calculating the relevant outside wage, but the 
shortcoming that it can calculate the outside 
wage only for the three years for which we have 
complete demographic data in the attitude 
survey.  For the second measure, which we 
refer to as the weighted-average outside wage, the 
proportions of employees in the firm in each 
age-education-race group in each terminal 
in 1996 are used as weights in an average of 
17The union grievance procedure makes it costly for 
the firm to fire employees without strong contractual 
grounds, and although it would be possible for the firm to 
build a case against an employee who had low productiv-
ity, typically dismissals are the result of a clear pattern of 
violations of contractually sanctioned disciplinary rules, 
such as those against stealing, coming to work drunk, 
excessive tardiness, or unexcused absences.
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the outside wages for each age-education-
race group in the CPS.  This is our preferred 
measure, because it allows us to construct an 
outside wage for all five years for which we 
have attitude data.  Formally, the two out-
side log-wage terms, the individual-specific 
outside wage, owijt, and the weighted-average 
outside wage, ow—jt, are calculated using the 
firm’s internal dataset in conjunction with 
the estimated coefficients from the CPS wage 
regressions as follows:
(2) owijt ˆ0,jt + D'1,kjt ˆ1,jt + D'2,kjt ˆ2,jt + 
D'3,kjt ˆ3,jt + D '4,kjt ˆ4,jt + D '5,kjt ˆ5,jt
(3) ow—jt g gj1996[owgjt],
where i indexes individuals in the firm, j
indexes terminals, t indexes years, D1, D2, D3,
D4, and D5 are defined as above, g indexes all 
possible age-education-race combinations, 
and gj1996 is the proportion of dockworkers 
in terminal j in year 1996 corresponding to 
age-education-race combination g.  Table 
2 contains summary statistics for the local 
unemployment rate and the outside wage 
terms.
3. Local Labor Market 
Conditions and Fairness Perceptions
3.1  Econometric Model
One consequence of the near-uniformity of 
wage structure across the terminals was that 
the gap between the wage that employees 
received in the firm and the outside wage 
varied substantially across terminals.  The 
weighted-average outside wage varied from 
$10.83 per hour to $18.97 per hour in the 
2000 cross-section, for instance.  We will 
see below that this cross-sectional variation 
in outside wages was negatively correlated 
with cross-sectional variation in fairness per-
ceptions:  where the outside wage was low, 
employees were more likely to perceive their 
wage as fair.  This correlation, however, may 
not reflect a causal relationship.  There may 
have been unobserved heterogeneity across 
terminals correlated with both the wage 
gap and employee attitudes, for instance, 
if employees were inherently less likely to 
think of their wage as fair in regions of the 
country with histories of labor-management 
conflict (that is, the industrial Midwest and 
Northeast), which also happened to be 
places where the outside wage was high.  A 
stricter test of the relationship between local 
conditions and fairness perceptions would 
control for time-invariant influences such 
as regional cultural differences.  For this 
reason, we include terminal fixed effects in 
our baseline estimates.18
The period of this study, 1996 to 2000, saw 
a steady expansion of the national economy 
and tightening of labor markets.  The indi-
cators of labor market conditions display a 
common national trend in the direction of 
lower unemployment over time.  If attitudes 
display a trend for reasons unrelated to local 
labor market conditions, then a regression 
of attitudes on external conditions may 
generate a spurious association.  To control 
for this possibility, as well as for region-in-
variant factors such as the negotiation of a 
new collective bargaining contract in 1998 
and company-wide changes in management 
practices, we also include year effects in some 
estimations.
We would expect workers’ wage-fairness 
perceptions to depend in part on the real 
purchasing power of their wage.  Nominal 
wages were nearly the same across terminals 
in the period of our study, but the prices 
of consumer goods differed.  Time-invari-
ant regional differences in price levels are 
captured by the terminal fixed effects and 
region-invariant inflation is captured by the 
year effects, but different regions experi-
enced different rates of inflation over time. 
For this reason, the regressions include the 
log of the base wage deflated by our region-
specific price index.
It may be that workers with certain ob-
servable characteristics are inherently more 
likely than others to think their wage is fair or 
unfair.  For regressions using the weighted-
average outside wage and all five years of 
data (1996–2000), we include indicators for 
tenure category.  For regressions using the 
18We are thus controlling for the persistent effects of 
workplaces on attitudes emphasized by Bartel, Freeman, 
Ichniowski, and Kleiner (2003).
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individual-specific predicted wage and three 
years of data (1996–98), we include a full 
set of indicator variables for age, education, 
race, sex, and tenure categories.  We might 
also expect the nature of the freight flow 
to affect workers’ fairness perceptions; the 
more onerous the task of unloading or load-
ing, the less fair we would expect a worker 
to consider his wage.  The firm’s projected 
work-time measure has been designed to 
capture differences in the amount of time 
required to move particular loads of freight, 
and we take it as an indicator of the onerous-
ness of the work.
We rank the responses to the fairness 
question in the order “disagree,” “?,” “agree,” 
and estimate the model as an ordered logit. 
Expressed as a latent-variable model, the 
model is the following:19
(4) f *ijt = 0 + Ujt 1 + (ow) 2 + wjt 3 + 
y'ijt 4 + s'jt 5 + j + t + vijt
(5) fijt = –1 + r=1
2
 1(f *ijt cr),
where i indexes individuals within a termi-
nal-year, j indexes terminals, and t indexes 
years; U is the local unemployment rate; ow
is one of the predicted outside wage terms, 
ow—jt or owijt;  w is the logarithm of the real base 
wage; y is a vector of indicator variables for 
individual characteristics, the dimension of 
which will vary according to which sample 
is used; s is the logarithm of projected work-
time; is a terminal fixed effect;  is a year 
effect; f * is the latent fairness response; f is 
the observed fairness response (coded –1, 0, 
1); the cr (for r = 1,2) are cut-points; and 1( ) 
is an indicator function, taking the value 1 if 
the enclosed expression is true, 0 otherwise. 
The distribution of the error term, v, is as-
sumed to be logistic.  The standard errors 
reported in all tables have been corrected 
to account for noise in measurement of the 
outside wage term (Murphy and Topel 1985). 
Because the unemployment variable and the 
weighted-average outside wage vary only at 
the terminal-year level, we cluster errors by 
terminal-year.  Following on the discussion 
above, we expect fairness perceptions to 
be positively related to the attractiveness 
of employees’ current job relative to their 
outside options.  That is, we expect fairness 
perceptions to be positively related to the 
unemployment rate and negatively related to 
the outside wage rate:  1 > 0 and 2 < 0.
20
3.2  Results
Figures 1–4 present a simple graphical 
depiction of the main results on the determi-
nants of fairness perceptions.  Figures 1 and 
2 present raw cross-sectional scatterplots of 
fairness perceptions in each terminal against 
the local unemployment rate and the weight-
ed-average outside wage, with each variable 
averaged over the 5-year period 1996–2000.21 
Figures 3 and 4 present scatterplots of the 
terminal-year average fairness perception 
against unemployment and the outside wage, 
with each variable deviated from the 5-year 
terminal means.  The regression lines are 
weighted by the number of respondents in 
each terminal.
The most remarkable pattern in the data 
is evident in Figures 1 and 3:  unemployment 
bears essentially no relationship to fairness 
perceptions in cross-section, but a strong 
and readily apparent positive relationship 
once terminal fixed effects are removed. 
19Our specification differs from those of Cappelli and 
Sherer (1988, 1990), the most closely related studies in 
the literature, in that we run an ordered logit, making 
use only of the ordinality of the attitude responses, 
rather than OLS regressions, which assume cardinal-
ity.  In our reported results, we avoid including other 
attitude variables as covariates because of concerns 
about the possible endogeneity of such additional 
attitude variables, but when (in unreported results) 
we run specifications similar to those of Cappelli and 
Sherer (1988, 1990), the level of explanatory power of 
our models is roughly similar.
20Note that employees may work harder when they 
perceive their wage to be fair, and this may dampen the 
fairness response to relative wages, since they may adjust 
their fairness perceptions according to “the work that 
[they] do,” as requested in the attitude survey.  Note 
further, however, that such a dampening effect would 
make it more difficult for us to find evidence for our 
hypothesis.
21In calculating the average fairness perceptions, 
“agree” responses were assigned the value 1, “?” the 
value 0, and “disagree” the value –1.
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Figures 2 and 4 suggest that the outside wage 
is negatively related to fairness perceptions 
both without and with terminal fixed effects, 
although the relationship is weaker than that 
for the unemployment rate with terminal 
effects illustrated in Figure 3.22
Table 3 presents the baseline estimates of 
the effect of local labor market conditions 
on wage-fairness perceptions, using the 
weighted-average outside wage and the long 
sample.  There is no statistically significant 
relationship between the local unemploy-
ment rate and wage-fairness perceptions 
without terminal fixed effects in column 
(1).  Once fixed effects are included in col-
umn (2), however, the positive relationship 
between unemployment and fairness percep-
tions shows up strongly, with a t-statistic of 
5.16.  It appears that deviations of the local 
unemployment rate from average levels were 
salient for fairness judgments, while average 
levels of unemployment themselves were not. 
Once year effects are included in column 
(3), the magnitude of the unemployment 
coefficient drops by 50%, suggesting that 
the coefficient on the unemployment rate 
in columns (1) and (2) is in part reflecting 
business-cycle effects that are common across 
Table 3.  Effect of Local Conditions on Fairness 
Perceptions:  Ordered Logit, Long Sample, 1996–2000.
(Dependent Variable:  Response to Wage-Fairness Question)
(1) (2) (3)
No Terminal Terminal Terminal and
Independent Variable or Year Effects Effects Only Year Effects
Local Unemployment Rate –0.283 30.787*** 15.193**
[8.356] [5.971] [6.549]
Weighted-Average Log Outside Wage –1.791** –0.706* –0.821**
[0.822] [0.430] [0.387]
Log (Real Wage) 13.969** 7.283*** –6.623
[5.970] [2.379] [7.799]
1–5 Yrs. Tenure –0.254 –0.273** –0.262*
[0.177] [0.132] [0.134]
6–10 Yrs. Tenure –0.795*** –0.807*** –0.810***
[0.154] [0.130] [0.132]
>10 Yrs. Tenure –0.927*** –0.912*** –0.907***
[0.146] [0.122] [0.125]
Log (Projected Work-Time) –0.527*** –0.549 –0.364
[0.170] [0.379] [0.361]
Cut 1 33.042* 17.947*** –23.185
[16.976] [6.762] [22.781]
Cut 2 33.511** 18.430*** –22.701
[16.977] [6.763] [22.780]
Terminal Effects No Yes Yes
Year Effects No No Yes
N 15,657 15,657 15,657
Pseudo R-Squared .032 .051 .053
Notes:  Robust standard errors in brackets.  Errors are clustered by terminal-year, adjusted for measurement error 
in the outside wage term.  Ordered-logit procedures ranks the fairness responses “Disagree””, “?” and “Agree”” in in-
creasing order.  Parameters cut 1 and cut 2 are ancillary cut-off parameters estimated by ordered-logit procedure.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
22Figure 2 illustrates the negative cross-sectional 
correlation between the outside wage and fairness 
perceptions mentioned in the first paragraph of sec-
tion 3.1, above.
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regions.23  But the important point is that 
the coefficient remains significant at the 5% 
level.  We conclude that variation in the un-
employment rate within a local labor market 
is a quite robust predictor of within-terminal 
variation in wage-fairness perceptions.  The 
negative association between our preferred 
outside wage measure and fairness percep-
tions is also robust.24  The coefficient on the 
outside wage term is statistically significant 
and of the expected sign without terminal 
fixed effects.  The coefficient is marginally 
significant when only terminal fixed effects 
are included, but again significant at the 5% 
level when both terminal and year effects 
are included.25
Tenure is also a strong predictor of em-
ployee wage-fairness perceptions.  Employees 
were decreasingly likely to consider their 
wage fair as their tenure increased.  There 
are at least two possible explanations.  One 
is that the tenure profile in the firm reaches 
the maximum wage quickly—workers with 
25 or 30 years of seniority are paid the same 
wage as those with 2 years—and more senior 
workers may resent this.  Another possible 
explanation is a change in overtime-allocation 
rules in the 1994–98 National Master Freight 
Agreement.  Prior to 1994, terminal managers 
were not allowed to hire temporary, “casual” 
dockworkers until all of the regular dockwork-
ers had worked all the overtime hours they 
wished to work.  Beginning with the 1994–98 
contract, terminal managers were allowed to 
hire casual dockworkers as soon as all regular 
dockworkers had worked 40 hours in a given 
week.  High-tenure dockworkers who were 
employed before 1994 may have resented 
the change in overtime policy more than 
low-tenure workers did.  Unfortunately, be-
cause the attitude data only cover the period 
1996–2000, it is not possible to differentiate 
between these two explanations.
The log of the real wage in each terminal 
enters as we would expect in columns (1) 
and (2):  as the real value of the wage rose, 
employees were more likely to consider it fair. 
Once year effects are included in column 
(3), the sign flips and the standard error 
rises.  The reason is that the terminal fixed 
effects and the year effects capture almost 
all of the variation in wages at the terminal 
level, and the real wage term in column (3) 
is identified on the basis of a small number 
of terminals with atypical wage changes over 
the period—in particular, one large terminal 
in which a wage increase relative to other 
23It may also be that including year effects exacer-
bates attenuation bias by absorbing much of the signal 
in the unemployment measure and reduces the point 
estimate.
24In unreported results, we entered unemployment 
and the outside wage term separately, and found coef-
ficient estimates not appreciably different from those 
presented in Table 3.
25Note that attenuation bias due to measurement er-
ror in the outside wage term—which is constructed from 
the (noisy) coefficients from a CPS wage regression—may 
make it less likely for us to find a statistically significant 
relationship than in the case of unemployment.
Table 4.  Marginal Effects Corresponding to Baseline Ordered-Logit Estimates.
Marginal Effects Corresponding  Marginal Effects Corresponding
to Table 3, Column 2  to Table 3, Column 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d[Pr(fair)]/ d[Pr(?)]/ d[Pr(unfair)]/ d[Pr(fair)]/ d[Pr(?)]/ d[Pr(unfair)]/
Independent Variable dx dx dx dx dx dx
Weighted-Avg. Log Outside Wage –0.14 0.03 0.11 –0.17 0.04 0.13
Local Unemployment Rate 6.26 –1.40 –4.86 3.09 –0.69 –2.40
Log (Real Wage) 1.48 –0.33 –1.15 –1.35 0.30 1.04
1–5 Yrs. Tenure† –0.06 0.01 0.04 –0.05 0.01 0.04
6–10 Yrs. Tenure† –0.17 0.03 0.14 –0.18 0.03 0.14
>10 Yrs. Tenure† –0.19 0.04 0.15 –0.19 0.04 0.15
Log (Projected Work-Time) –0.11 0.02 0.09 –0.07 0.02 0.06
Note:  Marginal effects are evaluated at the means of the covariates.  For dummy variables (indicated by †), the 
table reports the difference in Pr(fair) for values 0 and 1, holding other variables constant at their means.
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terminals in 1998 was accompanied by an 
unrelated deterioration in wage-fairness 
attitudes.
To facilitate interpretation of the size of 
the coefficients, Table 4 presents the marginal 
effects corresponding to the coefficient es-
timates in columns (2)–(3) in Table 3.  The 
effects in columns (1)–(3) of Table 4, corre-
sponding to the model that includes terminal 
fixed effects but not year effects (column 2 
of Table 3), indicate that an increase of 1% 
(slightly less than one standard deviation) 
in the local unemployment rate is associ-
ated with a 6.3% increase in the probability 
that the average employee in the firm will 
consider his wage fair, and a 4.9% decrease 
in the probability that he will consider it 
unfair.  A one-standard-deviation (approxi-
mately $1.50/hour) increase in the outside 
wage term would decrease the probability 
of a “fair” response by approximately 1.4%, 
and increase the likelihood of an “unfair” re-
sponse by 1.1%.  The corresponding numbers 
for the model including both terminal and 
year effects (column 3 of Table 3) are 3.1% 
and 2.4% for unemployment, and 1.7% and 
1.3% for the outside wage.
Table 5 presents results using alternative 
specifications of the outside wage term.  Col-
umns (1)–(2) report estimates of the basic 
model using the individual-specific outside 
wage and the short sample, taking full ad-
vantage of the individual-level demographic 
information available in the attitude survey 
(but dropping the years 1999 and 2000). 
Schooling is not a good predictor of fairness 
Table 5.  Alternative Specifications:  Ordered Logit.
(Dependent Variable:  Response to Wage-Fairness Question)
Short Sample, 1996–1998 Long Sample, 1996–2000
Terminal Terminal  Terminal
Terminal and Terminal and Terminal and
Effects Year Effects Year Effects Year
Only Effects Only Effects Only Effects
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ind.-Specific Log Outside Wage –0.524* –0.572**    
[0.272] [0.273]   
Weighted-Avg. Log Outside Wage,    –0.253 –0.365  
Alt. 1   [0.529] [0.441]  
Weighted-Avg. Log Outside Wage,    –0.716 –0.697
Alt. 2   [0.605] [0.533]
Local Unemployment Rate 46.495*** 14.245 31.545*** 16.445*** 31.878*** 17.433***
[11.412] [14.208] [5.581] [6.018] [5.857] [6.469]
Log (Real Wage) 11.536** –20.388** 6.863*** –5.338 6.273** –5.315
[5.104] [7.915] [2.459] [7.029] [2.539] [7.088]
1–5 Yrs. Tenure –0.196 –0.181 –0.277** –0.266** –0.276** –0.267**
[0.187] [0.187] [0.130] [0.131] [0.131] [0.131]
6–10 Yrs. Tenure –0.777*** –0.774*** –0.811*** –0.814*** –0.810*** –0.814***
[0.193] [0.193] [0.128] [0.130] [0.129] [0.130]
>10 Yrs. Tenure –0.988*** –0.979*** –0.915*** –0.911*** –0.914*** –0.910***
[0.189] [0.190] [0.120] [0.122] [0.121] [0.123]
Log (Projected Work-Time) –1.165*** –0.606 –0.487 –0.274 –0.536 –0.316
[0.436] [0.496] [0.374] [0.347] [0.364] [0.339]
Male –0.206 –0.201   
[0.249] [0.250]   
White 0.178* 0.189*   
[0.097] [0.098]   
Age 25–30 –0.144 –0.126   
[0.192] [0.198]   
Continued
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perceptions; nor is sex, although there are 
very few women in the sample against whom 
to identify the male coefficient.  Controlling 
for tenure, workers older than 50 were more 
likely than younger workers to consider their 
wage fair; in other words, controlling for 
other factors, the workers with the most posi-
tive attitude toward their wage were recently 
hired older workers.  Non-white workers were 
less likely than white workers to consider 
their wage fair.  The coefficient on race is 
only marginally statistically significant, but 
is relatively robust.
Consider now the coefficients on the 
outside wage and unemployment terms in 
columns (1)–(2).  Note that the outside 
wage term remains statistically significant, 
even after we control in more detail for the 
demographics of employees and focus the 
outside comparison on workers with identi-
cal characteristics.  The coefficient estimates 
are statistically distinguishable from zero, but 
not from the estimates using the long sample 
and the weighted-average outside wage in 
columns (2)–(3) of Table 3.
There are two main differences between 
the estimates for the unemployment coef-
ficients in columns (1)–(2) and those in 
columns (2)–(3) of Table 3.  The first is that 
the estimate of the coefficient in the specifica-
tions without year effects rises (from 30.787 to 
46.495).  This suggests that there is a negative 
correlation between the unemployment rate 
and demographic characteristics associated 
with positive wage-fairness perceptions that 
biases the unemployment coefficient down-
ward when the demographic characteristics 
are omitted.  This correlation appears to 
Table 5.  Continued.
Short Sample, 1996–1998 Long Sample, 1996–2000
Terminal Terminal  Terminal
Terminal and Terminal and Terminal and
Effects Year Effects Year Effects Year
Only Effects Only Effects Only Effects
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 31–40 0.006 0.037   
[0.212] [0.218]   
Age 41–50 0.151 0.181   
[0.224] [0.231]   
Age >50 0.558** 0.592**    
[0.242] [0.249]   
HS Diploma 0.164 0.181   
[0.133] [0.133]   
Some College 0.145 0.171   
[0.151] [0.152]   
College Degree 0.303 0.34   
[0.216] [0.217]   
Cut 1 30.902** –62.375*** 18.049** –18.076 15.092* –18.885
[14.489] [22.942] [7.605] [20.423] [8.032] [20.523]
Cut 2 31.343** –61.933*** 18.531** –17.592 15.575* –18.402
[14.487] [22.942] [7.604] [20.423] [8.032] [20.523]
Terminal Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 9,163 9,163 15,657 15,657 15,657 15,657
Pseudo R-Squared .061 .062 .051 .052 .051 .052
Notes:  Robust standard errors in brackets.  Errors are clustered by terminal-year, adjusted for measurement error 
in the outside wage term.  Weighted-average outside wage alternative 1 includes a blue-collar dummy but no union 
dummy in the CPS log-wage regression; weighted-average outside wage alternative 2 includes neither a blue-collar 
nor a union dummy in the CPS log-wage regression.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
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be common across terminals within years, 
however, since including demographics has 
little effect on the point estimates in the 
specification with year effects.
The second main difference is that the 
standard errors on the unemployment coeffi-
cients approximately double in moving to the 
short sample.  Although the unemployment 
coefficients are similar in the specifications 
with year effects (15.193 in the long sample 
and 14.245 in the short sample), the larger 
standard error means that the coefficient is 
no longer statistically significant.  The loss of 
approximately 40% of the data when we move 
from the long sample to the short sample 
may partly explain the decline in precision 
of the estimates.  Nonetheless, the fact that 
the coefficient on the unemployment rate is 
not statistically significant in this specification 
suggests a need for caution in interpreting 
our results for the unemployment rate.
Columns (3)–(4) and (5)–(6) of Table 
5 present results for the weighted-average 
outside wage term, but using two alternative 
specifications of the underlying CPS wage 
equation (equation 1).  Alternative 1 includes 
demographic indicators and a blue-collar 
indicator but not a union indicator.  Alterna-
tive 2 includes demographic indicators but 
neither a blue-collar indicator nor a union in-
dicator.  The coefficients on the outside wage 
terms are no longer statistically significant. 
The differences between these results and 
those using the preferred measure are largely 
attributable to differences in the patterns of 
union wage premia between the North and 
the South, which have been noted by Lewis 
(1986).  Although we believe that the com-
parison with unionized, blue-collar workers 
with similar demographic characteristics in 
the outside labor market was the most salient 
comparison for wage-fairness judgments, the 
fact that plausible alternative comparisons 
do not yield statistically significant results 
suggests caution is warranted in interpreting 
the results on the effect of outside wages.  It 
is notable that the point estimates for the 
unemployment coefficient in the long sample 
are not greatly affected by varying the defini-
tion of the outside wage term.
Do these estimates reflect a causal effect 
of local conditions on fairness perceptions? 
Here we consider two plausible counter-
arguments:  that the association is due to 
heterogeneity across terminals in the provi-
sion of overtime work, and that it is due to 
the selection of workers with management-
friendly attitudes into workplaces with high 
relative wages.26
While individual terminal managers in 
the firm do not have discretion over base 
wage rates, they do have discretion over 
the amount of overtime work offered to 
employees.  If it were the case that terminal 
managers increased the amount of overtime 
offered when local labor markets were slack, 
then we would expect to observe a positive 
correlation between unemployment and 
earnings in the terminal and hence a posi-
tive correlation between unemployment and 
wage-fairness perceptions.  The correlation 
between overtime hours as a percentage of 
total hours and unemployment, however, is 
negative.27  A similar result (with opposite 
sign) holds for the outside wage term.  In 
other words, managers were more likely to 
offer overtime when labor markets were tight 
and replacement workers hard to find; hence 
heterogeneity in the provision of overtime 
work cannot explain why employees were 
more likely to perceive their wage as fair 
when local labor markets were slack.
In periods of high unemployment in the 
local labor market, the firm may have been 
able to hire better-quality workers for a given 
wage.  If these better-quality workers were 
inherently more likely than other workers 
to have a positive attitude regarding the fair-
ness of their wage, then we might observe a 
positive correlation between unemployment 
and fairness perceptions due solely to this 
selection effect.  Since it is not possible to 
follow individual employees over time, we 
cannot control for such selection directly. 
Our primary strategy in addressing this issue 
is to examine the sensitivity of different ten-
26We also examined the relationship between re-
sponse rates and local labor market conditions and 
found no correlation.
27When we regress overtime hours as a percentage 
of total hours on unemployment and terminal fixed 
effects, weighted by the number of respondents, the 
coefficient on unemployment is –.30, with a robust 
standard error of .38.
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ure groups to local conditions.28  If terminals 
were actively selecting new employees on the 
basis of worker quality, then we would expect 
the wage-fairness perceptions of newly hired 
workers to have been more responsive to 
slack in the local labor market than those 
of workers with more tenure, since the total 
effect of local conditions on the wage-fairness 
perceptions of newly hired workers would 
have been the sum of two effects:  the direct 
effect of local conditions on wage-fairness 
perceptions and the effect of hiring more 
management-friendly new employees.29
Table 6 presents estimates of the basic 
model with unemployment and the outside 
wage interacted with the dummy variables for 
the four tenure categories; columns (1) and 
(2) interact only unemployment with tenure, 
columns (3) and (4) interact only the outside 
wage term with tenure, and columns (5) and 
(6) interact both unemployment and the 
outside wage with tenure.  In all specifications 
involving the unemployment interactions, 
the estimated slope of the fairness-unemploy-
ment relationship is steeper for the tenure 
categories 1–5 years, 6–10 years, and greater 
than 10 years than for the omitted <1 category. 
We can reject the hypothesis that the slope 
on the unemployment term is greater for the 
new hires than for the 1–5 years and 6–10 
years tenure groups at the 5% significance 
level (one-tailed test) in columns (1), (2), (5), 
and (6).  We cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the coefficient on the outside wage term is of 
greater magnitude for workers with less than 
one year of tenure than for the other tenure 
groups, but the point estimates in columns 
(5) and (6) also suggest that higher-tenure 
groups were, if anything, more responsive 
to changes in outside wages than were new 
hires.  In sum, the fairness perceptions of 
new hires do not appear to have been more 
sensitive to local conditions than were those 
of higher-tenure workers.
In addition, if terminal managers were 
actively selecting higher-quality workers with 
more positive attitudes in periods of slack 
labor markets, then we would expect them 
to have fired more workers in such periods 
to take advantage of the presumably higher-
quality pool of applicants.  Table 7 regresses 
the dismissal rate on our measures of local 
labor market conditions, including terminal 
fixed effects in column (1) and terminal and 
year fixed effects in column (2).  The results 
indicate that the relationship between the 
dismissal rate and the outside wage is zero 
in both specifications and the relationship 
between the dismissal rate and unemploy-
ment is either negative and not statistically 
significant or zero.  There is no evidence 
that the dismissal rate increased when local 
labor markets were slack.
Although we cannot definitively rule 
out the selection hypothesis, the available 
evidence suggests that selection effects are 
unlikely to be the primary explanation for 
the correlation between local labor market 
conditions and wage-fairness perceptions. 
Our results come with the caveat that the 
coefficients on the unemployment and out-
side-wage terms are not statistically significant 
in every regression, but the preponderance of 
the evidence supports the interpretation that 
the correlation between local labor market 
conditions and wage-fairness perceptions 
represents a causal effect:  a deterioration in 
local labor market conditions (an increase in 
unemployment and a decrease in the outside 
wage) led employees to think that they were 
being paid more fairly, and an amelioration 
had the opposite effect.30
28In unreported results, we use each new hire’s pre-
dicted rank in the CPS wage distribution in each local 
labor market in each year as an index of the desirability 
of his or her observable characteristics, and find that 
new hires did not have statistically significantly more 
desirable observable characteristics in periods of low 
unemployment than in periods of high unemployment. 
Using an additional question from the attitude survey, 
we also find that the responsiveness of employee atti-
tudes to external conditions is limited to wage-fairness 
perceptions, rather than perceptions of the fairness of 
management more generally.  Both results argue against 
the selection interpretation.
29Theories of internal labor markets, such as that of 
Doeringer and Piore (1971), suggest that low-tenure 
workers may be less insulated than high-tenure workers 
from conditions in outside labor markets.  The National 
Master Freight Agreement institutionalizes this pattern, 
by requiring employers to lay off employees by reverse 
seniority.  As a result, we would expect low-tenure workers 
to be even more responsive to outside unemployment 
than are more senior workers.
30We have also implemented an instrumental-variables 
strategy using the outside wage and unemployment 
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Table 6.  Interacting Local Conditions and Tenure:  Ordered Logit, Long Sample, 1996–2000.
(Dependent Variable:  Response to Wage-Fairness Question)
Interacting
Interacting Interacting Unemployment, 
Unemployment Outside Wage Outside Wage, 
and Tenure and Tenure and Tenure
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local Unemployment Rate 13.065 –3.184 30.501*** 14.785** 12.192 –4.324
[14.198] [13.042] [6.096] [6.536] [13.823] [12.799]
Weighted-Average Log –0.677 –0.798** –0.746 –0.832 –0.401 –0.48
Outside Wage [0.424] [0.382] [1.051] [1.058] [1.017] [1.013]
1–5 Yrs. Tenure –1.204*** –1.231*** 1.486 1.66 1.63 1.818
[0.445] [0.443] [2.668] [2.786] [2.536] [2.622]
6–10 Yrs. Tenure –1.601*** –1.614*** –1.537 –1.533 –1.372 –1.354
[0.484] [0.484] [2.837] [2.903] [2.646] [2.697]
>10 Yrs. Tenure –1.386*** –1.399*** –1.485 –1.395 –1.248 –1.151
[0.459] [0.464] [2.600] [2.684] [2.504] [2.574]
Unemployment (1–5 Yrs. 24.175** 25.174**  25.810** 26.973**
Tenure) [11.805] [11.837]  [11.715] [11.572]
Unemployment (6–10 Yrs. 20.644* 20.905*  21.204* 21.510*
Tenure) [12.172] [12.227]  [12.275] [12.191]
Unemployment (>10 Yrs. 12.634 13.126  13.025 13.604
Tenure) [11.669] [11.824]  [11.783] [11.735]
Weighted-Avg. Log Outside  –0.656 –0.717 –1.082 –1.165
Wage (1–5 Yrs. Tenure) [1.018] [1.064] [0.958] [0.985]
Weighted-Avg. Log Outside  0.274 0.271 –0.093 –0.106
Wage (6–10 Yrs. Tenure)  [1.066] [1.093] [1.009] [1.027]
Weighted-Avg. Log Outside  0.216 0.184 –0.056 –0.099
Wage (>10 Yrs. Tenure)  [0.984] [1.018] [0.965] [0.988]
Log (Real Wage) 7.454*** –7.051 7.270*** –6.694 7.396*** –7.141
[2.422] [7.753] [2.408] [7.833] [2.351] [7.343]
Log (Projected Work-Time) –0.537 –0.361 –0.539 –0.35 –0.52 –0.338
[0.383] [0.362] [0.386] [0.366] [0.378] [0.352]
Cut 1 17.847*** –25.069 17.801*** –23.423 18.403*** –24.499
[6.767] [22.511] [6.722] [22.535] [6.462] [21.199]
Cut 2 18.330*** –24.584 18.284*** –22.939 18.887*** –24.015
[6.767] [22.511] [6.723] [22.534] [6.462] [21.198]
Terminal Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 15,657 15,657 15,657 15,657 15,657 15,657
Pseudo R-Squared .052 .053 .052 .053 .052 .053
Notes:  Robust standard errors in brackets.  Errors are clustered by terminal-year, adjusted for measurement 
error in the outside wage term.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
rate as instruments for fairness perceptions in 
order to estimate the effect of fairness percep-
tions on employee performance (as measured by 
the dismissal rate or the ratio of actual work-time 
to projected work-time).  Such a strategy requires 
the strong assumption that local conditions af-
fect employee performance only through fairness 
perceptions—the exclusion restriction—which is 
vulnerable to criticism.  In the specification with 
terminal effects, our point estimate of the effect of 
fairness perceptions on the dismissal rate is negative 
as expected and of an economically significant mag-
nitude.  This estimate is not statistically significant, 
however, and when year effects are also included the 
point estimate is essentially zero.  On the advice of 
an anonymous referee, we omit the results.
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4. Conclusion
This paper has presented robust evidence 
that the unemployment rate and the wage of 
similar workers in the external labor market 
were important reference points—or compo-
nents of a composite reference point—for 
employee wage-fairness judgments in the firm 
we study.  To our knowledge, ours is the first 
study based on observations of workers in real 
workplaces to identify the effect of credibly 
exogenous determinants of employee wage-
fairness perceptions.31  Our results stand in 
contrast to findings from surveys of manag-
ers, which suggest that external labor market 
conditions are not important in determining 
employees’ wage-fairness perceptions (Be-
wley 2002; Levine 1993a).  An interesting 
question that remains unanswered is whether 
the unemployment rate and outside wage 
affected fairness judgments simply because 
they entered into an individual’s calculation 
of his expected payoff in the outside labor 
market or because they were in themselves 
salient points of comparison.  While our re-
search design does not permit us to evaluate 
the relative importance of internal versus 
external reference points in the formation 
of wage-fairness judgments, the results do 
suggest that in the future, formal models 
and empirical tests of the role of fairness 
perceptions should explicitly take external 
labor market conditions into account.  
Table 7.  Effect of Local Conditions on 
Dismissal Rate:  OLS, Long Sample, 1996–2000.
(Dependent Variable:  Dismissal Rate)
Terminal Terminal and
Effects Only Year Effects
Independent Variable (1) (2)
Local Unemployment –0.508 –0.006
Rate [0.387] [0.458]
Weighted-Average 0.001 –0.001
Log Outside Wage [0.025] [0.024]
Log(Real Wage) –0.053 0.426
[0.158] [0.378]
1–5 Yrs. Tenure 0.015 0.005
[0.027] [0.028]
6–10 Yrs. Tenure –0.01 0.014
[0.025] [0.027]
>10 Yrs. Tenure 0.006 0.003
[0.025] [0.027]
Log (Projected 0.008 –0.003
Work-Time) [0.027] [0.027]
Terminal Effects Yes Yes
Year Effects No Yes
N 144 144
R-Squared .346 .395
Notes:  Robust standard errors in brackets.  Errors 
are adjusted for measurement error in the outside wage 
term.  Tenure variables are terminal-level averages of 
individual-level indicator variables.  Results are weighted 
by the number of respondents in each terminal.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 
level; ***at the .01 level.
31Subsequent to our first submission of this paper, 
Mas (2006) has made an important contribution in 
the area.
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Data Appendix
Attitude Data
The possible responses to the demographic questions were the following:
—Age:  (1) 16–24, (2) 25–30, (3) 31–40, (4) 41–50, and (5) over 50.
—Education:  (1) Some high school, (2) High school degree, (3) Some college, and (4) College degree.
—Tenure:  (1) <1 year, (2) 1–5 years, (3) 6–10 years, (4) >10 years.
—Race:  (1) White, (2) Black, (3) Hispanic, (4) Asian/Pacific Islander, and (5) Native American.
For the race variable, there were few Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, or Native American respondents; categories 
(2)–(5) were consolidated into a single “Non-White” category.
Definition of Local Labor Markets
Of the 29 breakbulk terminals, 26 are located within MSAs.  One terminal is located within 5 miles of an MSA. 
In these cases, the corresponding MSA is taken as the local labor market.  Two terminals, both in the South, are 
located well outside the nearest MSA.  In these cases, we take all non-MSA areas of the state in which the terminal 
is located as the local labor market.  (County-level data are not available in the CPS for counties with population 
less than 100,000, which prevents us from defining the local labor market more narrowly for these two terminals.) 
In the case of unemployment, it would be possible to define local labor markets more narrowly, but the BLS warns 
that its estimates of unemployment below the MSA level may be subject to large and unquantifiable errors.
Regional Consumer Price Indices
We deflated both the hourly wage in the firm and the hourly wage we calculate from the CPS by a regional con-
sumer price index (CPI), constructed as follows.  For 12 of the 29 local labor markets, the BLS calculates a separate 
CPI for the corresponding MSA.  For the remaining 17 local labor markets, we used the regional CPI calculated 
for the corresponding Census region, Northeast, Midwest, South, or West.  The series is the CPI for all urban wage 
earners and clerical workers, for all goods.
Local Unemployment Data
The primary basis for employment estimates at the MSA level in the BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics 
is the joint federal-state Current Employment Statistics (CES) surveys, which gather information from worksites. 
The statistics are then converted to a place-of-residence basis using information on commuting patterns from the 
Current Population Surveys (CPS) and the decennial censuses.  Estimates of employment and unemployment at 
the state level, used in the case of the two terminals for which we employ non-MSA data, are based entirely on the 
Current Population Survey (CPS).  Average unemployment is calculated for the calendar year of the attitude survey. 
We experimented with an alternative specification of the unemployment rate, taking the average for June–August, 
the months in which the attitude surveys were carried out, but the results were unchanged.
Constructing the Outside Wage Measures
We re-code the CPS variables for age, race, and schooling to match the categories of the demographic ques-
tions on the attitude survey listed above.  We define blue-collar workers as workers in occupations 403–469 or 
503–889 of the CPS occupation codes.  This definition includes service occupations (including private household 
and protective service occupations) and excludes farming, forestry, and fishing occupations.  We define a worker 
as full-time if either (a) hours usually worked at the main job are reported as greater than or equal to 35 hours, 
or (b) hours usually worked are reported as variable and hours worked at the main job in the previous week are 
greater than 35 hours.
Our wage measure from the collective bargaining contracts for the firm is the hourly non-overtime wage.  We 
construct a similar measure from the CPS as follows.  If respondents report their hourly wage (not including over-
time, tips, or commission) in their main job, we take that measure as their hourly wage.  If they do not report their 
hourly wage, we calculate the non-overtime hourly wage as follows:  first, we calculate total weekly hours as a sum 
of hours usually worked at all jobs (if hours usually worked were reported as variable, we use hours worked at all 
jobs in the previous week); second, we calculate what an individual’s total weekly earnings would have been had 
he not earned an overtime premium by subtracting one-third of usual weekly overtime earnings from usual weekly 
earnings; third, we divide this adjusted weekly earnings measure by total weekly hours.  We deflate the hourly wage 
by the regional CPI, as described above.
We limit the sample to individuals in the CPS who fit all of the following criteria:  (1) Male.  (As mentioned 
above, 99% of the employees in the firm are male.)  (2) Civilian.  (3) Full-time, as defined above.  (4) Age 16–64. 
(5) Hourly wage (calculated as described above) greater than or equal to $3 in constant 1996 dollars.  (6) Weekly 
earnings less than $1,880.32 in constant 1996 dollars.  This is the value in 1996 dollars of the 1997 top-code of $1,923 
for weekly earnings.  The top-code was raised in January 1998, and the 1997 top-code is the lowest in real terms 
over the 1996–2000 period.  (7) Non-allocated earnings.  Neither region nor union status is an imputation match 
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criterion in the CPS outgoing rotation groups, and including allocated wages can introduce important biases.  For 
details, see Hirsch and Schumacher (2004).
Terminal-Level Variables from Firm
The dismissal rate is calculated as the number of dismissals and resignations in lieu of dismissal in the year as a 
fraction of total employment at time of survey.  The separation rate is calculated as total separations in the year as 
a fraction of total employment at the time of the survey.  The overtime share is calculated as yearly overtime hours 
as a fraction of total hours worked.
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